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Introduction
This paper is an attempt to explore how Giorgio Agamben adapts the traditional histo-
riographic school’s concept of  sovereignty and Michel Foucault’s concept of  biopolitics 
in his theory of  European state sovereignty. Due to formal restrictions, the aim is not to 
compare their theories of  power (although such comparisons, at certain points, will surely 
be inevitable), but instead will focus on the theory of  history that their theoretical works 
on European state sovereignty imply. It will be argued that Foucault’s novel approach to 
power and to history, although it initially shook the very foundations of  many human 
disciplines, has been successfully reconciled with historiographic theories I term tradi-
tional, in the works of  Agamben. The argument set out below, therefore, is two-fold. On 
one hand, it will attempt to show that for European state sovereignty, as conceptualized 
by Agamben, the population and the body is just as important as the territory and the 
juridical order is. On the other hand, it is contested that the theory of  history that this 
conceptualization implies is founded on an intertwined notion of  time, which introduces 
the total narrative of  European state sovereignty while simultaneously allowing for rup-
ture and human inventiveness.
In terms of  recent developments in the humanities, this theoretical reconciliation is 
presented as a process of  an overarching, yet verifiable development. The novelties the 
New Cultural History, through the works of  Foucault, have contributed to historiogra-
phy and political thinking which has challenged formerly mainstream traditions of  his-
toriographic and political thinking. One could argue that they reached their synthesis in 
Agamben’s theory of  sovereignty. It is proposed here that analyzing these theories within 
this novel framework, defined by interactive dynamism, calls for the reconsideration of  
relations between various historiographic approaches, as well as the opening up of  new 
paths for further interpretations of  history of  Western state sovereignty.
In terms of  methods, this study of  these trends and approaches will be limited to 
three thinkers, due to in part technical necessity. The three thinkers focused on are gen-
erally acknowledged as the major representatives of  the developments to be investigated 
here1. They are: Leopold von Ranke to represent the traditional school of  historiography 
which focuses on diplomatic and political history; Michel Foucault to speak for New 
Cultural History; and, of  course, Giorgio Agamben, whose theory is the principle focus 
1 For Ranke, see for example: Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 
2007), 144. For Foucault, see for example: Patricia O’Brien, “Michel Foucault’s History of Culture,” 
in The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1989), 33.
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of  this study. There is yet another, perhaps more problematic, methodological point re-
quiring clarification. The fact that Ranke, Foucault, and Agamben problematize European 
state sovereignty (broadly speaking) by utilizing different concepts and approaches makes 
it problematic to treat them as analytical equals difficult. That is, Ranke speaks strictly 
about the sovereignty of  the state, whereas Foucault refers to the biopolitical character of  
modern Western politics, and when Agamben writes on the inherently biopolitical char-
acter of  the sovereign, by which he means political power in general, and not the raison 
d’État of  the modern Western nation–state in particular. Nevertheless, it is suggested here 
that these conceptual differences are precisely those that make it valuable to study the 
complex theoretical relations, which are assumed here to be multifarious and dynamic, 
between these three approaches. Hence, due to the conceptual differences that allow for 
this research, when their subject matter is referred to collectively, the term European state 
sovereignty will be used. This term is not an exact one, yet it is precisely for this reason 
that it presents itself  as analytically appropriate and comprehensive expression to which 
each of  the thinkers’ key political concepts belong to.
The three thinkers’ understanding of  the concept of  sovereignty is such that it is 
necessary to establish the borders of  the research question, that is, to study the theory of  
history that their works on European state sovereignty implies. As Ranke did not articu-
late a theory of  sovereignty, secondary sources are necessarily exploited to broadly recon-
struct his views on this question. Consequently, we will refrain from drawing far-reaching 
conclusions from this reconstructed and rather putative position but will try to present 
his theory on history in general. Foucault, as is well-documented, was interested in sov-
ereignty as only one possible power form, specific to certain historical ages, and not 
as a comprehensive analytical concept through which European history can be studied. 
Therefore, in his case, his theory of  power forms is presented from which his historio-
graphic approach follows. Finally, the discussion of  Agamben’s theory of  sovereignty will 
be limited to its political context and relevance, as put forth in his book “Homo Sacer: 
The Sovereign Power and Bare Life”, complemented by “Means without End: Notes on 
Politics.” It is acknowledged here that while Agamben also conceptualizes sovereignty in 
other registers, e.g. theological,2 or ethical,3 which are interrelated with his political theory 
of  sovereignty and at the same time extend and complement it. Nevertheless, due to time 
and space restrictions the focus is solely restricted to the political horizon of  his under-
2 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealog y of Economy and Government, trans. 
Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011).
3 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999).
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standing of  the theoretical problem of  sovereignty, and then on the theory of  history that 
it implies.
The argument proceeds in three stages. First, a brief  introduction into the tradition-
al school is outlined by summarizing Ranke’s understanding of  sovereignty and history. 
Then, an outline of  Foucault’s theory of  power forms and its implications for history is 
given. Finally, we will embark on Agamben’s political theory of  sovereignty, pinpoint-
ing the traces of  both previous approaches but presenting the new theory as a radically 
new way of  conceptualizing both Western political thought and Western history. We will 
conclude by offering a new framework for interpreting the above theories in a dynamic, 
interrelated, and correlative way.
Ranke’s understanding of  sovereignty and the ambiguous 
political history
Ranke’s conceptualization of  the European state exhibits apparent similarities with that of  
Hegel. James Alfred Aho, while tracing the origins of  American sociology in the 19thcen-
tury German historical and social thinking, presents both Hegel and Ranke as two of  the 
“most notable proponents of  Realpolitik.”4 Inspired by Machiavellianism to formulate 
their critique of  Enlightenment liberalism, the theoreticians of  Realpolitik contested that 
“the state in its essence (Staatsräson) is organized power over a territory, rather than an 
institution whose sole purpose is to protect individual rights and property.”5 
Consequently, “in Ranke’s view, while the meaning of  the state is sovereign indepen-
dence, no state in historical fact has ever come into existence of  its own accords, inde-
pendently of  other states.”6 In other words, it is somewhat inevitable that a new state will 
arise in the milieu of  war and violence (and not as a result of  rational debate), generated 
by the tension between the legal right to statehood and the territorial claim of  already 
existing states.7 This tension―and the international war resulting from it―, however, is 
portrayed as a productive force. “War is the father of  all things… out of  the clash of  
opposing forces in the great hours of  danger―fall, liberation, salvation―the decisive new 
elements are born.”8
4 James Alfred Aho, German realpolitik and American sociolog y: an inquiry into the sources and political 
significance of the sociolog y of conflict (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1975), 30.
5 Aho, German Realpolitik, 29, 31.
6 Aho, German Realpolitik, 35.
7 Aho, German Realpolitik, 36.
8 Ranke, cited in Aho, German Realpolitik, 36.
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Sovereignty is the pivot around which the political realm is organized into interna-
tional and domestic spheres. Jens Bartelson, a researcher of  international political theory 
argues that for Ranke, sovereignty is both an organizing principle of  the international po-
litical system, established at the Peace of  Westphalia, as well as an invariant, characteristic 
only to the modern state.9 Therefore, the state, born out of  the violent clash of  opposing 
forces of  the international and the domestic spheres, seeks to establish and maintain its 
sovereignty. To preserve it, the state must stand on firm legal grounds. Bartelson points 
out that “to Ranke, the superiority of  Europe consists in its ability to resist hegemony in 
all guises, this being so since ‘it is not always recognized that the European order of  things 
differs from others that have appeared in the course of  world history by virtue of  its legal, 
even juridical nature.’”10
Briefly, Ranke regards the state as organized power over a territory. For him, it 
emerges as a sovereign entity from the productive tension, i.e. international war, that 
results from the inevitably antagonistic interests of  the international and the domestic 
realms, that is, the territorial claim of  existing states and the legal right to statehood. 
Therefore, law and territory constitute the foundations of  its sovereignty, and, some-
what paradoxically, also the conditions for further international wars. Sovereignty is thus 
the key organizing principle for Ranke by which politics at the international as well as 
the national level becomes comprehensible, and which, at least for the state, determines 
historical dynamics. All this notwithstanding, no articulate theory of  sovereignty can be 
traced in Ranke’s works.
How did Ranke relate to the study of  history? For Ranke, history can be understood 
at two levels, which are nevertheless in antagonistic position to each other. The Rankean 
understanding of  history, as it is synthetized by Leonard Krieger, a historian of  modern 
Europe in general, and Germany in particular, is to be located at the intersection of  the 
science of  history as Ranke propounded, and the philosophy of  history he subscribed 
to. To present the ambiguities in Ranke’s understanding of  history by breaking down 
his “dubious legacy,” Krieger develops a complex analytical framework comprising of  
two opposing sets of  principles. “The four Rankean principles which have constituted 
9 Bartelson phrases it as follows: “That is, sovereignty not only organizes relations between states by 
drawing them together into a system of states; it gives the modern state a past proper to its pres-
ent, and a present proper to its past, and this by drawing them together in a unity. With Ranke, the 
international is constituted as a genuinely historical mode of being, logically inseparable from the 
existence of states, but with its own organizing principles that are corollaries to internal sovereignty.” 
Jens Bartelson, A Genealog y of Sovereignty (Cambridge – New York – Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 225–226.
10
 Bartelson, Genealog y of Sovereignty, 231.
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the canon of  scientific history are the objectivity of  historical truth, the priority of  facts 
over concepts, the equivalent uniqueness of  all historical events, and the centrality of  
politics.”11 Later, Krieger adds that “Ranke announced four principles of  philosophical 
or theological history which may be placed in explicit counterpoint to his four principles 
of  scientific history.”12 He goes on by pointing out that Ranke had a “profound conjoint 
belief  in both particularity and generality as ultimate forms of  truth, in both individuality 
and universality as ultimate forms of  reality, in both freedom and necessity as ultimate 
conditions of  action, and in both national and world history as ultimate frames of  discip-
lined knowledge.”13
Probably the best-known contribution of  Ranke to history as a science was his 
unwavering commitment to the objectivity of  historical truth. As he put it in his famous 
book entitled Histories of  the Latin and Teutonic Peoples from 1494 to 1514, “history has had 
assigned to it the task of  judging the past, of  instructing the present for the benefit of  
ages to come. The present study does not assume such a high office; it wants to show only 
what actually happened” (wie es eigentlich gewesen).14 Krieger argues that this commitment 
was countered by Ranke’s critical reflection on the crucial role that the historian assumes, 
in order to be able to work: “Ranke acknowledged the constructive role of  the subject qua 
historian—not merely in the sense of  inevitable private limitations, but in principle… The 
object to be uncovered was not ready-made in the past, lying there to be simply copied 
by the historian; the historian’s activity was necessary to its constitution as a historical 
object.”15
The canon of  the primacy of  facts over concepts resulted from Ranke’s conviction 
that meaningful knowledge in history can only be gained through particular facts, not 
from general concepts, as the former always conveys the latter. He argued that “true 
doctrine lies in the knowledge of  the facts… An idea cannot be given in general; the thing 
itself  must express it.”16 Elsewhere, he wrote that “from the particular you can perhaps 
ascend… to the general. But there is no way of  leading from general theory to the per-
ception of  the particular.”17 Krieger indicates, however, that Ranke also regarded facts as 
means to greater knowledge, made available precisely by this greater knowledge: “Not 
only were historical facts for him instrumental to a kind of  understanding that trans-
11 Leonard Krieger, Ranke: The Meaning of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 4.
12 Krieger, Ranke, 10.
13 Krieger, Ranke, 14.
14 Cited Krieger, Ranke, 4.
15 Krieger, Ranke, 10.
16 Cited in Krieger, Ranke, 5.
17 Cited Krieger, Ranke, 5.
27ConCeptualizing the european history of state sovereignty
Pro&Contra 1 (2017) 21-42.
cended factuality, but this larger meaning was what the historian had in common with the 
otherness of  the historical fact and what thus made the knowledge of  the fact possible at 
all… For Ranke, then, what was beyond the fact was more valuable than the fact itself.”18
Ranke’s praise for individual and unique epochs in history was enshrined in his book 
On the Epochs of  Modern History. Here, he states that “every epoch is directly under God, 
and its value depends not on what comes from it but in its existence itself, in its own self. 
Thereby the consideration of  history, and indeed of  the individual life in history, acqui-
res a wholly distinctive stimulus, since each epoch must be seen as something valid for 
its own sake and as most worthy of  consideration.”19 Contrary to this position, Krieger 
reminds us of  Ranke’s belief  in progress and universal history. “He always postulated the 
idea of  a developmental totality which was axiologically superior to his individuals and 
made some of  them more valuable than others in the light of  it. Ranke’s commitment 
to universal history, literally fulfilled only toward the end of  his long life, was paramount 
for him in principle from the very beginning of  his career as an historian.”20 Formulated 
somewhat differently, Krieger argues that Ranke was against synchronic “dominant ideas” 
as “something conceptual” which reduces men to ”mere shadows or schemata incorpo-
rating the concept;” and against the diachronic “concept of  progress,” which reduces the 
history of  one generation to “a stage of  the next.”21
The centrality of  politics in history, also remarkably characteristic of  Ranke, has 
remained probably the most unchallenged creed of  all in traditional historiography. His 
primary unit in history is the state to which he attributes ontological priority. As Krieger 
argues, “states, he wrote, are ‘ideas of  God.’ By this he meant to indicate both that as ‘spi-
ritual substances’ states are themselves ‘individualities,’ each, like other historical agents, ‘a 
living thing… a unique self,’ and that states are a special kind of  individual through which 
the collective historical destinies of  men can be followed, since each state in its own way 
manifests ‘the idea that inspires and dominates the whole’ of  human institutions, deter-
mines ‘the personalities of  all citizens,’ and embodies the discoverable ‘laws of  growth.’”22 
Nevertheless, a glance at Ranke’s works—comprising 54 volumes of  “Universal History” 
—may arise questions with regard to his philosophy of  history. As for this latter, Krieger 
asserts that for him, “the state is a ‘modification’ of  both the nation and humanity: it is 
man in his orientation toward ‘the common good.’ Nations, in this view, are the orga-
18 Krieger, Ranke, 12.
19 Krieger, Ranke, 6.
20 Krieger, Ranke, 16.
21 Krieger, Ranke, 17.
22 Krieger, Ranke, 7.
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nizations of  humanity through which its universal history as a whole must be studied; 
states are the national organizations… through which the history of  nations—and thus 
of  humanity—in modern times must be studied. Nations and states [are] articulations of  
humanity.”23
One could conclude that Ranke’s view of  history is a peculiar ensemble of  dualities. 
Krieger summarizes vigorously and succinctly that “his inconsistencies, therefore, stem-
med from the contradictions within his theory itself, and these, in turn, stemmed from his 
deliberate neglect of  its internal relations; his theoretical propositions were aligned not 
with one another but rather with the specific facets of  actual history that instigated them, 
and what were differences in the degree of  generality for actual history became categori-
cal differences of  kind in the derivative theory. Ranke was, in short, an ad hoc theorist and 
an integral practitioner of  history; the internal connection between the different levels of  
history he worked with cannot be found in any logical coherence, which he did not even 
attempt, but in a temporal coherence, which he could not avoid.”24
Foucault’s theory of  changing power forms and the  
discontinuous European history
One could argue that Foucault did not develop a general theory of  power.25 Instead, he di-
vided European history into three ages, analytically speaking, according to dominant pow-
23 Krieger, Ranke, 19–20.
24 Ibid. 22.
25 “The analysis of these mechanisms of power that we began some years ago, and are continuing with 
now, is not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a the-
ory. This analysis simply involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, 
according to what processes, and with what effects, power is applied. If we accept that power is not 
a substance, fluid, or something that derives from a particular source, then this analysis could and 
would only be at most a beginning of a theory, not of a theory of what power is, but simply of power 
in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even 
when they are unsuccessful, of securing power.” Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, trans. 
Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 16–17. Later, at the very beginning of his 
study titled “The subject and power,” he makes the same statement in relation to his own work of the 
preceding decades: “I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the past 
twenty years. It has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of 
such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, 
in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” Cited in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 208.
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er forms.26 He distinguished sovereign power, disciplinary power, and regulatory power 
or biopower. He showed that the theoretical foundations of  these power forms was duly 
established in their respective ages.27 According to Foucault, “the juridico–political theory 
of  sovereignty—the theory we have to get away from if  we want to analyse power—dates 
from the Middle Ages. It dates from the reactivation of  Roman law, and is constituted 
around the problem of  the monarch and the monarchy.”28 The sovereign power “consist-
ed in the power to take life,” was exercised primarily through ritual killings.29 The sover-
eign power is founded by the social contract, therefore it addresses and is exercised over 
the “contracting individual and the social body.”30
With the emergence of  disciplinary power, we are drawing closer to what, for Fou-
cault, is currently the appropriate site for analysing power relations. The disciplinary form 
of  power prevailed over the sovereign form from the end of  the 17th century to the end 
of  the 18th century. 31 Its main end is normalization: “disciplines will define not a code of  
law, but a code of  normalisation, and they will necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon 
26 I will refrain from discussing Foucault’s concept of governmentality, not only because Agamben 
himself does not refer to it, but rather because, as scholar of philosophy Sven-Olov Wallenstein notes 
it in a book devoted to “Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality” that “’biopolitics’ … merges 
with the problem of ‘governmentality’ to the extent that Foucault, especially in the subsequent ‘The 
Birth of Biopolitics,’ almost seems to lose interest in the topic.” Sven-Olov Wallenstein, “Introduc-
tion: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality” in Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality, eds. Jakob 
Nilsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Södertörn: Södertörn Philosophical Studies, 2013), 12. Indeed, 
Foucault himself argues at the first seminar of the course titled “The Birth of Biopolitics” that “the 
analysis of biopolitics can only get under way when we have understood the general regime of this 
governmental reason I have talked about, this general regime that we can call the question of truth, 
of economic: truth in the first place, within governmental reason… So, forgive me, for some weeks 
– I cannot say in advance how many – I will talk about liberalism.” Michel Foucault, The Birth of Bio-
politics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke – New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 21–22. This promise was duly kept up to the very end of the course; Fou-
cault acknowledges in the course summary that “this year’s course ended up being devoted entirely to 
what should have been only its introduction. The theme was to have been ‘biopolitics’.” Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics, 317.  
27 Foucault reconstructs the basic tenets of each three from the then contemporary literature on the 
foundations of political power. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 111–145.
28 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David 
Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 34. He ascribes the development of the “know-how” of the “art of 
being Prince” to Machiavelli. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 131.
29 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 247.
30 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”. He also argues that “sovereignty is exercised within the borders 
of a territory.” Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 25.
31 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 250.
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that is not the edifice of  law, but the field of  the human sciences.”32 Through surveillance 
and control as means for normalization, it addresses not the subject, nor the social body, 
but the individual body.33
With the rise of  the regulatory power or biopower, life has entered the conceptual 
horizon of  politics, and this entry, i.e., the inclusion of  life into politics, is what defines 
our days in terms of  power. Biopower has emerged at the end of  the 18th century, because 
of  the birth of  capitalism. Therefore, it aims primarily at maximizing the productive po-
tential in the population, in order to maintain political hegemony.34 As economic produc-
tion is surmised upon healthy society, biopower is articulated through the state-level care 
for life: the state observes the biological processes of  masses, “a set of  processes, such as 
the ratio of  births to deaths, the rate of  reproduction, the fertility of  a population, and 
so on.”35 Consequently, it addresses “the population as a political problem, as a problem 
that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem, and as power’s problem.”36 
These changes in the focus of  power result in the emergence of  new scientific disciplines: 
demography, statistics, and social medicine, by which the state could rationally control and 
manage the natural processes of  the population.37
To sum up Foucault’s theory of  power, the above scheme outlines a gradual increase 
in the complexity of  power. The power forms did not follow each other in chronological 
order, the older disappearing with the emergence of  the more recent, but instead have 
layered upon each other, resulting in the coexistence of  the various forms.38 Although 
not dominant, disciplinary mechanisms are still at operation today, and yet there is ample 
room for the sovereign power to return, or, as Foucault famously put it, “we still have not 
cut off  the head of  the king.”39 Nevertheless, political power shifted its focus from jurid-
ico–political subjects and society, in order to devote almost sole attention to life, around 
the end of  the 18th century. The modes of  its articulation have been tempered from ex-
emplary ritual killings, through surveillance to explicitly provident ways of  taking care for 
32 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 38.
33 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 250.
34 As Ádám Takács, a Foucault-scholar notes, “for Foucault, the rise of biopolitics and biopower 
appears as distinctive mark of the birth of late modernity – or that of capitalism, if you like.” Ádám 
Takács, “Biopolitika és nemzeti állapot: egy foucault-i problematika rekonstrukciója,” in Kötőerők, ed. 
András Cieger (Budapest: Atelier, 2009), 19.
35 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 247.
36 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 245.
37 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 145–146.
38 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 25.
39 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction, trans. David Hurley (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978), 88–89.
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the biological well-being of  the population. The European state today, for Foucault, is not 
so much concerned about its legitimacy anymore, as it is about expectable profits resulting 
from the productive forces of  the human resource.40
sovereign power disciplinary power regulatory 
power/biopower
time period from the Middle Ages from the end of  the 
17th century
from the end of  the 
18th century
problematique legitimate rule of  the 
monarch
normalising the indi-
vidual body
maximising the pro-
ductive potential in 
the population
articulation ritual killing surveillance, discipline care for life
focus the individual and the 
society (territory)
individual body population
Table 1. Power forms of  the Western state, according to Foucault
For Foucault, the history of  European state sovereignty consists first of  all in rup-
tures and dissimilarities, as Table 1. seeks to demonstrate. The most important rupture for 
this paper, what Foucault calls the “threshold of  modernity,”41 is to be located around the 
end of  the 18th century, when life enters the sphere of  politics and immediately becomes 
the center of  political strategies. This shift results in the reconceptualization of  power 
that Foucault terms biopower.
With regard to historiography, Foucault makes it explicit in the “Introduction of  
Archaeology of  Knowledge” that his interest in the discontinuities and ruptures in his-
tory clearly separates him from the traditional form of  historiography and philosophy of  
history. His approach shares several patterns with the what he calls new history (nouvelle 
histoire): its aim to construct series in history (as opposed to “great ages,” “great units,” or 
40 Of course, Foucault is not naïve to assume that by today, violence would have withdrawn from the 
realm of politics. Quite the contrary, he argues that biopower, precisely because of considering life as 
the only value, is in position to expose war (and killing in general) as the legitimate means to defend 
ourselves, i.e. life, the only value, through the discourse of racism (Foucault, “Society Must Be Defend-
ed”, 258). Nevertheless, he himself devotes incomparably more attention to the economic rationality 
of the government, unfolding this theory under the term “governmentality,” than to state-level rac-
ism implemented by explicitly violent measures. This is precisely the feature of Foucault’s theory that 
is later identified as a blind spot by Agamben, and thus addressed and developed into a novel theory 
of European state sovereignty.
41 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 143.
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“civilizations”), its application of  discontinuity both as instrument and object of  research, 
and its dismissal of  the possibility of  writing a total history, aiming instead to write a 
general one. 42 
At the same time, Foucault and the scholars of  new history challenge not only the 
postulates of  the internal dynamic and development in history, but also that of  “the 
sovereignty of  the subject, and the twin figures of  anthropology and humanism,” also 
characteristic to the traditional form of  history.43 Also, human agency and socio–eco-
nomic structures are no longer in the focus of  historical research. As Raymond Caldwell, 
researcher of  agency in organizational theory puts it, “Foucault’s ideas have led to a rejec-
tion of  agency–structure dichotomies and a move towards process-based ontologies of  
‘organizing/changing’ that create new problematics of  agency as discourse.”44
It is through the analysis of  power relations and of  discourses that one may gain 
knowledge about the social world and the subject. “Power is everywhere… Relations of  
power are not in a position of  exteriority with respect to other types of  relationships 
(economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the 
latter. Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resis-
tance is never in a position of  exteriority in relation to power.”45 That is, the social subject 
participates in power relations in various social contexts by both resisting power and at 
the same time imposing it, being interim dominated and dominant. 
But how is it possible that the subject is simultaneously placed in these seemingly 
antagonistic forms of  power relations? For Foucault, it is allowed for by discursive prac-
tices that form the subject by decentring it.46 The subject is thus not a pre-given, stable 
42 Michel Foucault, The Archaeolog y of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 7–11. Here, Foucault exposes the projects of total and general 
history as remarkably distinct from one another: „the project of a total history is one that seeks to 
reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle – material or spiritual – of a society, the 
significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion – 
what is called metaphorically the ‘face’ of a period… The problem that now presents itself – and 
which defines the task of a general history – is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately 
described between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming; what in-
terplay of correlation and dominance exists between them; what may be the effect of shifts, different 
temporalities, and various rehandlings; in what distinct totalities certain elements may figure simul-
taneously; in short, not only what series, but also what ‘series of series’ – or, in other words, what 
‘tables’ it is possible to draw up.”
43 Foucault, Archaeolog y of Knowledge, 12–13.
44 Raymond Caldwell, “Agency and change: Re-evaluating Foucault’s legacy,” Organization 14, no. 6 
(2007): 769.
45 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 93–95.
46 Foucault, Archaeolog y of Knowledge, 31–32.
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and constant element marching through history, but is discursively formed in relation 
to various fields that do not necessarily converge towards an integrate hidden locus, nor 
they are historically persistent. The subject is discursively decentred and thus is uncertain. 
As Foucault’s œuvre demonstrate, there are multiple fields of  discourse: penal institutions, 
prison, school, psychiatry, sexuality, society, population, security, medicine, self, body, in-
sanity, abnormality–but a few of  the sites of  discourse. Regarding historical research, this 
implies that a study may be conducted on the phenomena of  everyday life (school, body, 
sexuality, mental hygiene, for instance) and yet be able to contribute to scientific knowl-
edge with something relevant to say about power relations.
To sum up, the history of  European state sovereignty as Foucault frames it is built 
upon discerned discontinuities and differences, and it has changed fundamentally at the 
end of  the 18th century, as a result of  life’s entrance into its conceptual horizon. It is 
indeterminate, its subject is decentred, and considers both human agent and structure 
secondary from a historiographical point of  view. For the major drivers or producers of  
history for Foucault are power relations and discourse. As a result, history, as he sees it, 
can be studied using various resources, focusing on various subject matters of  everyday 
life. Nonetheless, the study of  history does not conclude in complete narrative for West-
ern politics or Western man but will provide a general framework for understanding and 
interpreting them.
Agamben’s biopolitical sovereign and an intertwined notion of  
time
Agamben’s political theory presupposes the equal importance of  the juridico–political 
concept of  the sovereignty of  the nation–state and the concept of  the biopolitical care 
for the individual body and the body politic. To reconstruct the very structure of  sover-
eignty, as it is conceptualized in the nation–state, he applies philology, cultural anthropol-
ogy, legal and political theory amongst other scientific disciplines.
In order to understand the horrific history of  20th century Europe in conceptual 
terms, when nation–states turned from democracies into predators trying to annihilate 
their own citizens, and then back to democracies again as welfare states, Agamben returns 
to Aristotle and the ancient Greek language.47 He shows that the Greeks had two words to 
express what we understand by “life:” zoe to denote mere biological existence, shared by 
all living beings; and bios to indicate politically qualified life, the proper way of  living for an 
47 Although Agamben is, among others, a political philosopher, here I am going to present not his 
philosophy on what politics should be, but only his theory on what it apparently is.
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individual or a group.48 He argues that this distinction is reflected in Aristotle’s definition 
of  man, the political animal (zoon politikon), or, as Foucault famously formulated, a “living 
animal with the additional capacity for political existence.”49
Agamben’s argument is based on the fact that in conceptual terms, with Aristotle, 
the relation between life and politics is that of  inclusive exclusion. Politics, understood as 
an “additional capacity” referred to above, is defined by the exclusion of  life. Nonetheless, 
it does not cease to maintain relation with life, as it cannot be made sense of  without it. 
That is, to define politics, we need the concept of  life. Therefore, in terms of  conceptual 
history, life from the outset has been the constitutive concept of  politics.50
This argument on the inclusively exclusive relation between life and politics consti-
tutes the core of  Agamben’s political theory. He shows that the issues of  the polis (what 
does good life consist in? what is the purpose of  this community? how to reach the 
immortal fame?) concern certain problems beyond the problematique of  the biological ex-
istence of  man (how to harvest more crops? whom should I marry my daughter to? how 
to be cured of  illness?), which is confined to the household, the oikos. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of  the former is always premised upon the wise management of  the latter (in 
technical terms, as Arendt contested),51 but also upon the separate existence of  the latter 
(in conceptual terms, as Agamben argues). 
Therefore, when he writes that “the production of  a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of  the sovereign power,” he means that to maintain and distinguish the oikos and 
zoe from the polis and bios is the most important task of  the sovereign, for otherwise it 
would conceptually, and hence technically, cease to exist.52 To further support this con-
ceptual argument, Agamben turns to cultural anthropology for empirics. He brings legal 
examples from Antiquity through the Middle Ages, and on up to pre-Modern Europe 
to cases when a community deprived its own member from his political existence, thus 
relegating him from bios to zoe, expelling him from polis to oikos.53 Agamben exposes these 
examples as evidence that the production of  the biopolitical body has always been a sys-
temic phenomenon (and not merely a set of  contingent cases), and served to re-enforce 
the sovereignty of  the community by re-drawing its boundaries, by re-articulating the 
definition of  politics through the inclusive exclusion of  life.
48 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.
49 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.
50 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.
51 Arendt, Promise of Politics, 121.
52 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 6.
53 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 71–115.
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Nevertheless, the conceptual (and hence technical) indistinguishability of  oikos and 
polis, zoe and bios was precisely what was aimed at from the end of  the 18th century onwards. 
As Agamben reads the history of  European state sovereignty, “the categories whose op-
position founded modern politics (right/left, private/public, absolutism/democracy, 
etc.)” entered into the zone of  indistinction, from the decisive moment when political 
power appeared as committed to integrate zoe into the polis, i.e. to concern biological 
problems as political problems, to turn every human being into a citizen at the moment 
of  their birth (targeting the individual body with means of  control and surveillance, and 
thus creating the body politic), etc. This decisive moment is the emergence of  the nation–
state, around the time of  the publication of  the Des Droits de l’Homme et le Citoyen, during 
the French Revolution.54 To formulate this commitment as a logical statement, one could 
say that the nation–state has been authorized to perform the following syllogism: it is the 
citizen who is the sovereign; but every man is a citizen; therefore, every man is sovereign.
Although the head of  the king had been cut off  by then, and sovereignty was shared 
among the collective of  citizens, sovereign power has proven remained, both in concep-
tual and in technical terms. Despite the steps that were taken to reduce omnipotent sov-
ereign power by means of  the law (through the constitutional establishment of  the rule 
of  law), sovereign power itself  could not be weakened. The reason for this is that there 
are exceptional cases for every community when, for the sake of  its survival, the rule of  
law must be suspended and direct sovereign rule be applied. And since it is the sovereign 
who decides on the state of  exception, as Agamben argues in line with Carl Schmitt, at the 
end of  the day “the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order.”55
This means that on every site which is normally regulated by law – which, since the 
rise of  what Foucault calls biopower, have belonged first and foremost to life – under the 
state of  exception, the sovereign is free to exercise power which in legal terms is limitless. 
Normally, under the rule of  law, it is the legal order that is exclusively entitled to rule 
within the nation–state, and the sovereign power is suspended. But, as the sovereign is au-
thorised to decide on the state of  exception (that is, the suspension of  law), it may at any 
point in time return to “produce a biopolitical body,” that is, bodies over which sovereign 
power is not mediated by law .56
54 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000), 19–20.
55 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 15.
56 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 15–29.
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For Agamben, the sovereign is who decides on the relation of  law and life, that is, 
who decides which regularities or areas of  life it wishes to bring under legal control.57 To 
give just a few examples, these areas cover euthanasia, abortion, eugenics, definition and 
care of  incurable patients, but even the official, medical definition of  death—and con-
sequently, life itself.58 Once brought under legal control, the application of  law on these 
areas can be suspended at any time, and direct sovereign power can be exercised upon it, 
without the need to justify it in any terms. Thus, the sovereign of  the nation–state does 
not aim to carry out economic calculations to maximize the potential in the population, 
as it would with Foucault, but instead to take care of  the individual body and to safeguard 
the survival of  the body politic—by any means, be that, paradoxically, the individual body 
itself.
As the founding principles of  the nation–state, “the trinity of  the state–nation–ter-
ritory” were exposed as invalid after the First World War (as a result of  the Peace of  Ver-
sailles which testified to the fact that the actual sovereign is not man, as part of  a nation, 
but the strongest, the victor),59 the nation–state has sought to consolidate its sovereignty 
by any means, which was, as argued above, the continuous interruption of  the legal order, 
and thus the production of  biopolitical bodies.60 20th-century Europe bore witness to the 
fact that this means was often exploited; most remarkably when, having risen to power 
through democratic elections, the Nazi government in 1933 suspended the application 
of  the law for some 12 years,61 constructed the legal categories of  first- and second-class 
citizen, and established the concentration camp.62 
For Agamben, the paradox of  the nation–state can be explained only at this con-
ceptual level. The nation–state is only considered legitimate insofar it is committed to the 
pursuance of  the syllogism according to which every man is citizen and is thus sovereign. 
The nation–state has been equipped with all the necessary means to carry out this task, 
the history of  which is written by Foucault: administration, state medicine, disciplines of  
statistics, demography etc. At the same time, the sovereign power is free to suspend the 
57 With regard to the definition of the sovereign, what Agamben does is the logical completion of the 
Schmittian definition (the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception by suspending the 
law). Agamben points to the fact that law can be suspended only if it has formerly been introduced. 
So, the logical order is the introduction of law first, and its suspension only later. Therefore the dif-
ferentia specifica of the sovereign for Agamben is the decision on the relation of law and life, i.e. that 
it decides on which regularities of life it wishes to apply law to, which then later may be suspended.
58 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 137, 162.
59 Agamben, Means without End, 21.
60 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 12.
61 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 168.
62 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 149.
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application of  law at any time it pleases, and if  it does so—Agamben asserts that it cer-
tainly does, as it is the only site for the application of  its power—it produces biopolitical 
bodies (which in this case means that it produces men that are citizens of  no state, i.e., 
men who are not sovereigns). It is only by looking at this paradox from this historical and 
conceptual position that we can understand why and how democracies caring for the lives 
of  their citizens were able to become totalitarian regimes annihilating their own citizens, 
and then turn back into democracies again.
What does this theory of  sovereignty imply for historical studies or historiography? 
If  at all, what kind of  theory of  history can be extracted from it? It appears that for Ag-
amben, time does not induce qualitative change on its subject matter, as if  only quantita-
tive changes occurred throughout history, with all the creative work being done already. 
As he argues in his early essays, “our culture should conceive from its very origins a split 
between two different, correlated and opposed notions of  time,” that history is to be 
found at the intersection of  cyclical time and linear time.63 Cyclical time is “measured by 
the movements of  the stars, motionless, synchronic temporality,”64 with fixed structures 
in which no proper actions are performed. Linear time, on the other hand, is cumulative, 
diachronic temporality with fluid structures and events taking place, one after the other. 
As Agamben summarises, “the Western experience of  time is split between eternity and 
continuous linear time.”65
From the point of  view of  the cyclical experience, it seems that Western history 
is nothing but the total and fatally determinate narrative of  the continuous unfolding 
and realization of  the Aristotelian definition of  man. This definition (man as “political 
animal,” or as rephrased by Foucault, “animal with the additional capacity for political 
existence”) points straight to the fact that what is political in man is necessarily metaphys-
ical and thus has no empirical existence, which makes its precise analytical understanding 
highly problematic.
This problem, at least in Agamben’s argument, has not been overcome in the past 
two millennia. This is not the result of  the incapacity of  political thinkers after Aristotle to 
reflect on the meaning of  politics but demonstrates rather the adequacy of  the Aristote-
lian definition. Exposing Western political thinking in this light would amount to the rec-
ognition of  the Aristotelian definition as the “best we can ever have,” the “furthest we can 
ever go.” Nevertheless, what his definition performs, as we tried to demonstrate above, is 
63 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience trans. Liz Heron (London – 
New York: Verso 1993), 73–74.
64 Agamben, Infancy and History, 73.
65 Agamben, Infancy and History, 104.
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rather the critical delimitation of  the problem of  politics than the precise denomination 
of  what exactly it is. Therefore, what has been left to be done is the theorization of  this 
critical delimitation, that is, the relation of  politics to life.
This is precisely the point where the linear experience of  time enters play, that is, 
where intervention in the cyclical motion becomes possible. For there is at least one 
shift that this theory appears to identify. Agamben does not state, as Foucault does, that 
life entered the conceptual horizon of  politics only at the end of  the 18th century, as for 
Agamben, life has been present there from the very outset by definition. Nevertheless, 
the mission that modernity assumed (i.e., integration of  zoe into the polis, i.e. the perfor-
mance of  the syllogism of  man/citizen/sovereign) had not been formulated beforehand. 
Therefore, the juridico–political conception of  the sovereignty of  the nation–state—cen-
tral for traditional historiography—which first appeared as the carrier of  this mission, is 
certainly worthy to be further studied. 
So, for Agamben, there is an exit from the gloomy and totalizing narrative of  Euro-
pean state sovereignty. The exit way, which sometimes appears only as a theoretical possi-
bility perhaps, presents itself  as a rupture of  the cyclical order, a breaking point, a window 
of  opportunity for intervention. This intervention must address the conceptual relation 
of  politics to life, to establish what he calls “form-of-life” or “happy life.” By form-of-life, 
Agamben denotes a way of  overcoming the distinction between bare biological existence 
and political life, between zoe and bios, “in which it is never possible to isolate something 
like a naked life.”66 Form-of-life is “a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have 
any hold,”67 which thus implies an “irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty.”68 That is, 
what a potential intervention has to address is the abandonment, or at least the fundamen-
tal reconceptualization, of  the concept of  sovereignty.
66 Agamben, Means without End, 8.
67 Agamben, Means without End, 114.
68 Agamben, Means without End, 7.
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Ranke Foucault Agamben
stable element in the history 
of  European state sover-
eignty
state discourse and 
power rela-
tions
the conceptual–lin-
guistic threshold 
separating and 
connecting politics 
and life
driver in the history of  Eu-
ropean state sovereignty
productive ten-
sion (often war 
and violence) 
between oppos-
ing international 
and domestic 
forces
discourse and 
power
the conceptual–lin-
guistic barrier (yet, 
we are within the 
Aristotelian con-
ceptual horizon)
foundation of  the sovereign-
ty/legitimacy of  European 
state
law and terri-
tory
life law, life and terri-
tory
focus of  historic study of  
European state
sovereignty population the sovereign and 
the biopolitical 
body
lineage of  history meaningful, 
developing, 
but neither 
synchronic nor 
diachronic
unknown, 
consists in 
ruptures, 
indetermi-
nate with no 
stable focal 
point
emanates from the 
split between cycli-
cal, synchronic and 
linear, diachronic 
time
Table 2. Comparison of  the implications for historiography of  Ranke, Foucault and Agamben’s 
political theory of  sovereignty
As Table 2 above tries to show, Agamben’s political theory of  sovereignty and the-
ory of  history refer both to traditional historiography founded by Ranke and to the new 
history established by Foucault. He regards the state as a significant historical executive 
of  the logic of  sovereignty, which is based on the conceptual barrier separating and con-
necting politics and life. But the state is by no means the only executive, as the same logic 
conceptually appears in various historical and linguistic contexts, from the distinction of  
bios from zoe, the citizen from the man, the first-class citizen from the second-class citizen, 
to name only a few. Therefore, one can conclude that from the point of  European state 
sovereignty, the conceptual–linguistic threshold comprising the unequal conceptual pair 
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of  life (undefinable but empirically existent) and politics (undefinable and empirically 
non-existent) is determinant in historical terms. Also, it is this threshold that should be 
abandoned or reconceptualised by addressing a form-of-life.
The foundations of  sovereignty are both law and territory, which are the tenets 
of  the Rankean state, and biological life as well, fundamental for Foucault as legitimacy 
of  the biopower—this is what for Agamben “the trinity of  the nation–state–territory” 
means. Consequently, while it is sovereignty for Ranke and population for Foucault that 
is the ultimate raison d’État, Agamben argues that both are fundamental for the Euro-
pean state, as they mutually refer to and posit each other. Regarding the lineage of  the 
history of  European state sovereignty, Ranke holds the peculiar duality of  rejecting both 
synchronic and diachronic temporality, and at the same time assumes history to be the 
meaningful and developing narrative of  individual ages. For Foucault, this history cannot 
be known a priori, can be studied from various angles, and exhibits several discontinuities. 
For Agamben, history emanates from the split between cyclical and linear time, results 
from the opposing but correlated experience of  synchronic and diachronic temporality. 
With regard to European state sovereignty, historical time has not yet exceeded the Ar-
istotelian conceptual horizon of  the threshold of  life and politics, but apparently allows 
for such an exit. 
Concluding remarks
Agamben’s political theory of  sovereignty seems to be radical, as it is able to apply the 
concepts and approaches of  both traditional historiography (universal history, sovereign-
ty, state, juridico-political order, territory) and that of  New Cultural History (discursively 
formed subject, life, biopolitics, individual body, body politic), but combines them in 
a qualitatively new way, which produces a theory of  sovereignty and of  history that is 
unlike either of  its forerunners.  Our aim was not so ambitious as to draw far-reaching 
conclusions concerning historiography in general. Instead, we were trying to provide a 
new analytical framework for understanding, on the one hand, Agamben’s political theory 
of  sovereignty, building on both the traditional and the new conceptualizations of  Euro-
pean state sovereignty and power, and on the other hand, his theory of  history, relying on 
mainstream as well as postmodern historiography. What is yet to be done, at least if  we 
take Agamben’s insights seriously, is the theorization of  the threshold of  politics and life, 
which in other words is the identification of  points of  intervention in the cyclical motion 
of  the Western experience of  time.
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